The Peter A. Allard School of Law

Allard Research Commons
Faculty Publications

Allard Faculty Publications

2014

Judicial Review and Parliamentary Debate: Enriching the Doctrine
of Due Deference
Liora Lazarus
Allard School of Law at the University of British Columbia, lazarus@allard.ubc.ca

Natasha Simonsen

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.allard.ubc.ca/fac_pubs
Part of the Law Commons

Citation Details
Liora Lazarus & Natasha Simonsen, "Judicial Review and Parliamentary Debate: Enriching the Doctrine of
Due Deference" in Murray Hunt, Hayley Hooper & Paul Yowell, eds, Parliament and Human Rights:
Redressing the Democratic Deficit (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2014) 385.

This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Allard Faculty Publications at Allard Research
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Allard
Research Commons.

1

20
Judicial Review and Parliamentary Debate: Enriching the
Doctrine of Due Deference
LIORA LAZARUS AND NATASHA SIMONSEN

P

ARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY IS

often conceptualised as the opposite of

judicial supremacy, and the struggle for democratic legitimacy with respect
to human rights as a perennial tug-of-war. 1 The contributions in this volume

argue that the relationship between courts and the legislature need not be a zero sum
game, as these institutions can work together to protect human rights. This chapter
makes some bold propositions on how to develop that partnership and enrich the
doctrine of due deference. Our argument is that rigorous and respectful judicial
examination of democratic processes enhances constitutional dialogue, increases the
opportunities for judicial deference and heightens the transparency with which
deference is exercised. This proposal challenges established constitutional orthodoxy

in the UK. But constitutional orthodoxy is also an evolving phenomenon that has
adapted to changing constitutional landscapes over time.
This chapter is divided into two sections. Part A outlines the doctrine of due
deference and its relationship to judicial review, making a case for courts to consider
the quality of legislative debate when deciding whether and how to defer. Part B
proposes a set of criteria that we think judges ought to take into account when
exercising deference.
The discussion that follows is premised on a particular set of assumptions. We
assume a high level of institutional functioning and competence of parliament, the
executive and the courts. We assume further that each of these institutions is
committed both to protecting human rights, and to fostering a constructive
1
See, eg, R Ekins, ‘Judicial Supremacy and the Rule of Law’ (2003) 119 Law Quarterly Review 127;
PA Joseph, ‘Parliament, the Courts, and the Collaborative Enterprise’ (2004) 15 King’s College Law
Journal 321; R Ekins, ‘The Authority of Parliament: A Reply to Professor Joseph’ (2005) 16 King’s
College Law Journal 51. For a criticism of this dichotomous understanding of parliamentary and
judicial supremacy, see M Hunt, ‘Reshaping Constitutionalism’ in J Morison, K McEvoy, and G
Anthony, Judges, Transition and Human Rights (Oxford, OUP, 2007), 467-77.
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constitutional dialogue. With these parameters in place, there is a case that domestic
and supranational courts should consider the quality of democratic deliberation in
their decisions about when and how to defer to the elected branches.
I. DUE DEFERENCE AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
Opponents of judicial review argue that it diverts and undermines democracy.2 The
judiciary’s common response to this criticism is to exercise self-restraint and defer to
the legislature when evaluating the human rights pedigree of legislation.3 But the
relationship between the three branches of government with respect to human rights is
now evolving towards a ‘modern constitutionalism which rejects the old dichotomy
between political and legal constitutionalism’, and embraces the shared responsibility
of ‘all branches of the State, the Government, the Parliament and the Courts … to
uphold the rule of law.’4 This dialogic model of constitutionalism views the judiciary
and the legislature as partners in a common enterprise,5 rather than adversaries in a
perpetual contest for supremacy. It calls on the one hand to strengthen democratic
oversight of human rights, and on the other hand to find creative ways for courts to
complement these participatory processes.
The constitutional dialogue model has developed in the UK and elsewhere6
against the backdrop of a changing human rights landscape. These changes include
2

See generallyJ Waldron, ‘Judicial Review and the Conditions of Democracy’ (1998) 6 Journal of
Political Philosophy 335–355; J Waldron, ‘Moral Truth and Judicial Review’.
(1998) 43 American Journal of Jurisprudence 75; J Waldron, The Dignity of Legislation (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1999); M Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (New
Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1999); R Ekins, above n1; LD Kramer, The People Themselves:
Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review (Oxford, OUP, 2004); J Waldron, ‘The Core of the
Case against Judicial Review’ (2005) 115 Yale Law Journal 1346.
3
See, eg, RA Edwards, ‘Judicial Deference under the Human Rights Act’ (2002) 65 Modern Law
Review 859; A Kavanagh, ‘Participation and Judicial Review: A Reply to Jeremy Waldron’ (2003) 22
Law and Philosophy 451.
4
M Hunt, ‘The Joint Committee on Human Rights’ in A Horne, D Oliver and G Drewry (eds)
Parliament and the Law (Oxford, Hart, 2013).
5
A Barak, The Judge in a Democracy (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2006) 15-19; A Barak,
Purposive Interpretation in Law (New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 2007), 250. See also B
Mclachlin, ‘Charter Myths’ (1999) 33 University of British Columbia Law Review 23, 34-6, describing
the ‘symbiotic’ relationship between courts and the legislature in realising the rights in the Canadian
Charter. See further Joseph, above n1, 322-3, describing the ‘constitutional relationship of
interdependence and reciprocity’ between parliament and the courts, in which each branch ‘is engaged
in a collaborative enterprise…committed to the same ends and ideals, albeit in different, task-specific
ways’. This relationship of ‘institutional interdependence’ should be distinguished from their
‘operational independence’, 335 (emphasis original).
6
These features are common to other developed countries with constitutional democratic models of
government such as Canada, Germany, South Africa, Israel, Australia and New Zealand.
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the creation of parliamentary select committees to strengthen the role of parliaments
in protecting human rights and improve the quality of legislative deliberation on
rights.7 At the same time, there has been growth and strengthening of independent
human rights institutions, equality bodies, non-governmental organisations and other
civil society groups, 8 leading to a broader human rights ‘bricolage’. 9 These
developments support stronger institutional oversight, and have resulted in an
improved array of mechanisms for resolving conflicts with respect to human rights.
These changes are important steps towards creating and maintaining a culture of
justification, whereby citizens can reasonably expect that every exercise of power will
be justified, and ‘the leadership given by government rests on the cogency of the case
offered in defence of its decisions, not the fear inspired by force at its command’.10
But the human rights landscape is also characterised by significant challenges.
These include the increasing pressure on courts through expanding demand for
judicial review of human rights,11 leading to parallel efforts to restrict access to
relief.12 The mounting pressure on judicial processes is augmented by calls for special
7

See, eg, C Evans, and S Evans, ‘Legislative Scrutiny Committees and Parliamentary Conceptions of
Human Rights’ [2006] Public Law 785; M Hunt, ‘The Impact of the Human Rights Act on the
Legislature: A Diminution of Democracy or a New Voice for Parliament?’ [2010] European Human
Rights Law Review 601.
8
There is a growing body of literature on this trend and its implications: see, eg, R Murray, ‘The
Relationship Between Parliaments and National Human Rights Institutions’ in J Morison, K McEvoy
and G Anthony, Judges, Transition and Human Rights (New York, OUP, 2007) 357-76; T Pegram,
‘Diffusion Across Political Systems: The Global Spread of National Human Rights Institutions’ (2010)
32 Human Rights Quarterly 729; R Carver, ‘A New Answer to an Old Question: National Human
Rights Institutions and the Domestication of International Law’ (2010) 10 Human Rights Law Review
1; R Carver, ‘One NHRI or Many? How Many Institutions Does It Take to Protect Human Rights? –
Lessons from the European Experience’ (2011) 3 Journal of Human Rights Practice 1; B de Witte,
‘New Institutions for Promoting Equality in Europe: Legal Transfers, National Bricolage and European
Governance’ (2012) 60 American Journal of Comparative Law 49.
9

B de Witte, ibid.
E Mureinik, ‘Bridge to Where - Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights, A’ (1994) 10 South African
Journal on Human Rights 31, 32. See also D Dyzenhaus, ‘Law as Justification: Etienne Mureinik’s
Conception of Legal Culture’ (1998) 14 South African Journal on Human Rights 11; and L Lazarus,
‘Conceptions of Liberty Deprivation’ (2006) 69 Modern Law Review 738.
10

11
For a brief analysis of the increasing number of judicial review applications in the UK, see R Rogers,
‘Judicial Review Statistics: How Many Cases Are There and What Are They About?’ The Guardian
Datablog, November 19, 2012, available at: www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2012/nov/19/judicialreview-statistics. The raw data is available at: www.gov.uk/government/publications/judicial-andcourt-statistics-annual.
See
also,
as
regards
Strasbourg,
www.echr.coe.int/echr/en/header/reports+and+statistics/reports/annual+reports/. For discussion of the
implications of that increase, see the report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, ‘Enhancing
Parliament’s Role with Respect to Human Rights Judgments’, 15th Report of Session 2009-10, March
26, 2010, HL 85/HC 455. See also N Simonsen, ‘The Strasbourg Court, The ‘Exhaustion of Domestic
Remedies’ Rule, and the Principle of Subsidiarity: Between a Rock and a Hard Place?’ Oxford Human
Rights Hub, March 18, 2013, available at: www.ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/?p=1235.
12

See, in the UK, G Parker, ‘Cameron Set to Reform Judicial Review’, Financial Times, (18
November 2012). Reduced funding and access restrictions to legal aid will also have the effect of
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measures and exceptions on national security grounds, leading to the development of
new regimes for secret evidence, special advocates, and the development of
preventative models for the criminal law.13
The recent changes in the human rights landscape and the challenges they bring
necessitate a shift in the institutional pattern of human rights protection. In particular,
we think these developments present new possibilities for courts to exercise restraint.
But these developments also raise some important, and difficult, questions. To what
extent should courts consider the quality of democratic debate? What considerations
should guide courts in considering legislative materials? Our view is that courts
should consider the quality of democratic debate in deciding whether and how to
defer to the legislature when reviewing human rights. If parliament has done its job
well, its decisions should invite a high degree of deference from the courts. Thus, our
model positions parliaments squarely in the centre of the frame.
Supranational courts too should pay close attention to democratic debates in
member states to bolster the principle of subsidiarity. The Strasbourg Court has
followed this approach when applying the margin of appreciation in the recent cases
of Hirst (No 2), 14 Animal Defenders International15 and Shindler.16 In each of these
cases, the Strasbourg Court assessed the quality of the democratic debate that had
preceded the passage of rights-restricting measures to determine to what extent the
margin of appreciation applied. This is a welcome development in the Court’s case
law, offering a useful departure point for extension by domestic courts.
Given their proximity to domestic legislative processes, domestic courts
should defer as often as they can to preserve the legitimacy of judicial review.
Presently, this objective is hampered by the absence of a clear and principled answer

limiting access to judicial review in the UK. See the Ministry of Justice Consultation Transforming
Legal
Aid,
9
April
2013,
available
at:
www.consult.justice.gov.uk/digitalcommunications/transforming-legal-aid. In the ECtHR context, see the Interlaken Declaration and
Action Plan (19 February 2010), aiming to improve implementation of ECtHR judgments at the
national level.
13
For a discussion of these aspects, see L Lazarus, B Goold and C Goss, ‘Control Without Punishment:
Understanding Coercion’, in J Simon, and R Sparks (eds), The SAGE Handbook of Punishment and
Society (London SAGE Publications Ltd, 2012), 463-492.
14

Hirst v United Kingdom (No 2) (2006) 42 EHRR 41. See in particular paras 21-24, 78 and 79.
Animal Defenders International v United Kingdom (App No 48876/08) (April 22, 2013) (GC). See in
particular paras 42—55; 108, 110 and 114.

15

16

Shindler v United Kingdom (App No 19840/09) (May 7, 2013). See in particular paras 22—28, 102,
and para 117.
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to the question of how and when English courts should defer.17 Aside from the
question-begging proposition that some matters fall within the competence of the
legislature or executive while others lie within the competence of the courts, 18
attempts to structure analysis of deference have met with limited success.
Notwithstanding Laws LJ’s more rigorous exposition in Roth,19 many cases continue
to follow the opaque approach to deference in R v Lichniak. 20 There, Lord Bingham
(with whom Lord Steyn agreed) asserted without substantiation that ‘a degree of
deference [was] due to the judgment of a democratic assembly on how a particular
social problem is best tackled’.21 The critical questions that the case left unanswered,
and which subsequent cases also skirt, is what degree of deference is due, and when is
it justified?
Our view is that, in a culture of justification, deference should be earned by
the legislature. 22 Rather than simply noting, as Lord Bingham did in Lichniak, that
‘there have been numerous occasions on which Parliament could have amended [the
section] had it wished’,23 courts should consider whether Parliament ‘meaningfully
engaged’ with the rights considerations in play.24 Concretely, this means they should
17
See, inter alia, C Gearty, ‘Reconciling Parliamentary Democracy and Human Rights’ (2002) 118
Law Quarterly Review 248, 249 describing the engagement of the senior judiciary with the Human
Rights Act 1998 as ‘rather ad hoc and unprincipled’. See also J Jowell, ‘Judicial Deference: Servility,
Civility or Institutional Capacity?’ (2003) Public Law 592, arguing that ‘It is becoming clearer by the
day that the most difficult question for the courts in the interpretation of the Human Rights Act 1998 is
the extent to which they should defer to Parliament and other institutions of government on matters
relating to the public interest’; and R Clayton, ‘Judicial Deference and “Democratic Dialogue”: The
Legitimacy of Judicial Intervention Under the Human Rights Act 1998’ [2004] Public Law 33,
observing that ‘English courts have yet to articulate a developed approach towards judicial deference
when considering human rights claims’.
18

See the opinion of Hoffmann LJ in R (Prolife Alliance) v BBC [2003] UKHL 23; [2004] 1 AC 185.
Jowell summarises this proposition as the ‘dichotomy … between principle (involving moral rights
against the state—a matter for judges to determine) and policy (involving utilitarian calculations of the
public good—a matter for the legislature or its agents to determine)’, ibid, 593, citing R
Dworkin,Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1978). Hunt’s description of
this ‘spatial language of areas or margins of discretion’ is apt: see M Hunt, ‘Sovereignty’s Blight: Why
Contemporary Public Law Needs the Concept of “Due Deference”’, in N Bamforth, and P Leyland,
(eds), Public Law in a Multi-Layered Constitution (Oxford, Hart, 2003), 339.
19

International Transport Roth GmbH & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002]
EWCA Civ 158; [2003] QB 728 (per Laws LJ, dissenting) [hereafter ‘Roth’].
20

[2002] UKHL 47; [2003] 1 AC 903.
R v Lichniak, ibid, 912 (per Bingham LJ) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
22
M Hunt, above n18, 340 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
23
R v Lichniak, above n20, 911 (per Bingham LJ).
24
The concept of ‘meaningful engagement’ is transplanted here from South African jurisprudence,
including, inter alia, Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road Berea Township and 197 Main Street Johannesburg
v City of Johannesburg and Others [2008] ZACC 1 (CC); Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western
Cape v Thubelisha Homes and Others [2009] ZACC 16 (CC); City of Johannesburg Metropolitan
Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd and Another [2011] ZACC 33 (CC); City of
Johannesburg v Changing Tides 74 (Pty) Ltd and 97 Others [2012] ZASCA 116 (CC). In the South
21
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consider whether the Parliament rigorously debated the measure; what kind of
scrutiny it was subjected to at the committee stage and in parliament; the nature of the
right that the measure impugns; and the extent of the restriction on the right.25 If these
conditions are satisfied, then the measure in question should attract a high degree of
deference from the courts. Structuring the assessment of deference according to such
criteria will not only increase the transparency with which deference is exercised, but
will also lead to new opportunities for deference where the Parliament is doing its job
well.
In contrast, if courts are free to ignore the deliberations of the democratically
elected branches, and if they fail to defer as a consequence, they will likely face a
crisis of legitimacy at some point, regardless of their constitutional mandate. In the
tension between majoritarian democratic processes and protecting fundamental rights,
judicial review is justified as a corrective or complement to democracy. If, like Ely,
we see judicial review as self-correction where majoritarianism fails to protect the
interests of the unrepresented or the minority, then it follows that judicial review must
always examine whether the legislature has applied its mind to the rights
considerations in question and act where those processes have fallen short.26 It is hard
to see how judicial review can be justified if it ignores legislative deliberation
altogether. Where there is scope for disagreement, and room to defer, the courts
should do so.
The same arguments apply with equal, if not greater force to international
courts, where the principle of subsidiarity ‘underpins the obligation on State Parties to
ensure Convention rights are secured at the national level.’27 The further international
courts are from the democratic deliberations of signatory states, the more strained the
international order will become.28 The Strasbourg Court has acknowledged that ‘the
African context ‘meaningful engagement’ has been used as an interim remedy to prompt the parties to
come to a deliberative solution without the court’s intervention. While the context is different, the
standards applied in the assessment of meaningful engagement may well offer guidance in how Courts
can assess parliamentary procedures. See further discussion below, 14.
25

These criteria are developed in Part B below.
JH Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial Review (Cambridge, Harvard University
Press, 1980); see also A Nolan, Children’s Socio-Economic Rights, Democracy and the Courts
(Oxford, Hart, 2011).
26

27

L Lazarus, C Costello, N Ghanea, and K Ziegler, The Evolution of Fundamental Rights Charters and
Case Law (1 February, 2011) European Parliament Directorate-General for Internal Policies, 75,
available at: www.ssrn.com/abstract=2210448.
28

This presumably explains why the European Court has softened its position in the face of public
outcry over the prisoner voting debate in the UK and the deportation of terror suspects such as Abu
Qatada.
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national authorities have direct democratic legitimation and are, as the Court has held
on many occasions, in principle better placed than an international court to evaluate
local needs and conditions.’29 The recently concluded Protocol 15 to the European
Convention will add a reference to the preamble ‘affirming’ that States parties ‘in
accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, have the primary responsibility to
secure the rights and freedoms defined in this Convention… and that in doing so they
enjoy a margin of appreciation’.30
In the Strasbourg context, assessing the quality of legislative debate in
deciding whether a particular measure falls within the margin of appreciation allows
the principle of subsidiarity to operate to its fullest effect. Until recently, the European
Court was criticised for its failure to develop clear criteria or principles as to when a
measure falls within the margin of appreciation. 31 However, in Animal Defenders
International the Strasbourg Court built on its earlier decision in Hirst (No 2),
developing an approach that bears directly on the performance of Parliament in its
deliberative process. The Grand Chamber said that a determination of the
proportionality of a general measure demands an assessment of ‘the legislative
choices underlying it’, including the ‘quality of the parliamentary and judicial review
of the necessity of the measure’.32 It went on to analyse the legislative history of the
prohibition on political advertising on broadcast television in detail.33 This included a
review of the provision by a parliamentary committee in 1998, publication of a White
Paper in 2001 which included discussion of relevant Strasbourg case law; consultation
with specialist bodies such as the Joint Committee on Human Rights and the Electoral
Commission; and the bipartisan support which the passage of the 2003 Act had
attracted. 34 The Grand Chamber thus described the impugned measure as ‘the
culmination of an exceptional examination by parliamentary bodies of the cultural,

29

Hatton v UK [2002] 34 EHRR 1, para 97.
Article 1, Protocol 15 amending the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (open for signature May 24, 2013) (not yet in force).
30

31
See, eg, E Brems, ‘Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Case-law of the European Court of
Human Rights’ (1996) 56 Zeitschrift Fur Auslandisches Offentliches Recht Und Volkerrecht 240; HC
Yourow, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of European Human Rights
Jurisprudence (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 1996); Arai-Takahashi, Y, The Margin of Appreciation
Doctrine and the Principle of Proportionality in the Jurisprudence of the ECHR (Cambridge,
Intersentia, 2002).
32

Animal Defenders International v UK, above n15, para 108. The quality of the legislative and
judicial review of the measure was later described as ‘of central importance’ to the outcome: para 113.

33
34

ibid, paras 42-55.
ibid, para 114.
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political and legal aspects of the prohibition’,35 and confirmed that this justified the
degree of deference that domestic courts had afforded to parliament in judicial
review. 36 It also justified the UK Parliament being afforded a wide margin of
appreciation in deciding how best to implement the Article 10 right to freedom of
expression.
We broadly support the Strasbourg Court’s approach to the margin of
appreciation in Animal Defenders International. In what follows, we propose a set of
criteria to further structure its analysis of parliamentary debate and apply it across
other cases, as well as to help domestic courts in the UK and elsewhere to develop a
more principled doctrine of due deference. The level of scrutiny that courts apply in
assessing legislative debate will no doubt differ depending on the court’s mandate and
the legal culture. 37 In some countries, judicial scrutiny of democratic processes
follows from an obligation to enforce constitutional norms of democratic procedure.
For example, the South African Constitution obliges parliament to facilitate public
participation in its decision-making processes. 38 In the Doctors for Life case the
South African Constitutional Court held that all branches of government have an
interest in courts making sure that Parliament fulfils its constitutional obligations, and
in correcting democratic procedures if required. 39 That is a strong mandate to confer
upon a constitutional court, but even in countries such as Israel where the courts lack
that explicit mandate, they are often asked to scrutinise parliamentary debates.40 Thus,
35

ibid.
ibid, para 115. For a summary of the domestic proceedings, see the judgment of the House of Lords
in R (On the application of Animal Defenders International) v Secretary of State for Culture, Media
and Sport [2008] UKHL 15; [2008] 1 AC 1312.
36

37
See, eg, M Hunt, ‘The Human Rights Act and Legal Culture: The Judiciary and the Legal
Profession’ (1999) 26 Journal of Law and Society 86.
38

See ss59 and 72, Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. See further ss 73–82, which
oblige ‘public debate’ on proposed constitutional amendments (s 74(5)(c)) and allow members of the
National Assembly to apply to the Constitutional Court for a determination of the constitutionality of a
proposed bill.
39
Doctors for Life International v Speaker of the National Assembly and Ors (2006) 6 SA 416 (CC)
(17 August 2006), hereafter ‘Doctors for Life’.
40

The Israeli Supreme Court—with no express constitutional mandate to do so— has considered
matters such as, inter alia: whether the Prime Minister of Israel had correctly exercised his discretion
with respect to removal of a Minister from office (HCJ 3094/93 Movement for Quality Government v
State of Israel 47(5) PD 404); and whether an outgoing executive acted lawfully in entering peace
negotiations with the Palestinians, in circumstances where it lacked the confidence of the parliament
(HCJ 5167/00, Weiss v Prime Minister of Israel 55(2) PD 455); and decisions of the Speaker of the
Knesset with respect to tabling matters in Parliament and the length of time for debate (HC 9070/00
Livnat v Chairman of Constitution, Law & Justice Committee 55(4) PD 800, 813). For discussion of
these and other cases, see, Barak, A, The Judge in A Democracy, above n5, and Barak-Erez, D,
‘Broadening the Scope of Judicial Review in Israel: Between Activism and Restraint’ (2009) 3 Indian
Journal of Constitutional Law 118.
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even English courts are not unfamiliar with questions of the relevance and weight to
be attached to parliamentary materials. Our proposal builds upon this experience, as
well as the example set by the Strasbourg court in recent decisions.
These propositions may encounter resistance based on practical grounds such
as the potential lengthening of court proceedings and/or the complexity of
judgments;41 the limited capacity and expertise of parliamentarians with respect to
human rights; 42 or fears that judicial scrutiny might have a ‘chilling’ effect on
parliamentary speech. 43 But the gains of enhancing democratic dialogue, and
improving the transparency with which deference is exercised, weigh strongly against
such pragmatic considerations. In any event, a clear discussion of due deference at the
outset of judicial rights analysis offers the potential to shorten rather than lengthen
court proceedings. In our view, objections grounded in constitutional orthodoxy are
no more insurmountable than these pragmatic objections. The prospect of courts
taking a view on the quality of democratic debate arguably raises the same spectre of
constitutional crisis as would the prospect of courts ignoring those debates altogether.
As Simon Brown LJ said in Roth, ‘constitutional dangers exist no less in too little
judicial activism as in too much.’44 The politics of assessing a democratic debate are
no less fraught than the politics of rights interpretation and judicial override of
legislation.
We believe that the debate on the legitimacy of judicial review has reached an
impasse and objections grounded in constitutional orthodoxy ought to be re-evaluated.
This contribution is given in the spirit of moving this debate on from the question of
whether courts can exercise legislative review, to the question of how best legislative
review can be conducted in light of an overriding commitment to parliamentary
democracy. If we shift the debate to these terms, the critical issue becomes how that
analysis should be structured.

41
See, eg, the criticisms in J Steyn, ‘Pepper v Hart: A Re-Examination’ (2001) 21 Oxford Journal of
Legal Studies 59.
42

See, eg, the circumstances raised in Evans and Evans, above n7, which ‘make it difficult for
parliamentarians adequately to analyse human rights issues in parliamentary debate’, such as the
‘crowded parliamentary agenda, combined with bills of ever greater complexity’ and the fact that
‘many, perhaps most, members of parliaments lack the expertise that would allow them to make an
assessment of the human rights implications of legislation, even if they had the time or interest to do
so’: 785-6 (citation omitted).
43
44

see, eg, the discussion in HJ Hooper, Chapter 19 of this volume.
[2002] EWCA Civ 158; [2003] QB 728, 754 (per Simon Brown J) [hereafter ‘Roth’].
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II. CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING LEGISLATIVE DEBATE
We propose a set of specific criteria to give structure to the overarching question,
given the quality of the deliberative process, how weighty are the rights
considerations in question? Our approach suggests that certain institutional questions
ought to be resolved before the proportionality analysis takes place.45 If the quality of
legislative debate has been strong, then the court should approach the rights limiting
measure with a presumption of deference that may be rebutted only by very weighty
rights considerations.
Legislative debate that engaged meaningfully with rights considerations was
evident in the passage of rights-restricting measures in Animal Defenders
International46 and in Shindler,47 and in both cases the quality of the debate was
invoked to support the Court’s conclusion that the measures fell within the State’s
margin of appreciation. In Animal Defenders International, a majority of the Grand
Chamber endorsed the parliamentary debate in the context of its analysis of the
proportionality of the measure, attaching ‘considerable weight’ to the view of the
legislature that the measure was ‘necessary in a democratic society’.48 In Shindler, the
Court considered the parliamentary debate and select committee proceedings as
evidence that ‘Parliament has sought to weigh the competing interests and to assess
the proportionality of the [rule].’49
Conversely, where the legislative debate invites little deference, the courts
should be exacting in their scrutiny. This more exacting approach was evident in Hirst
(No 2), where the Grand Chamber observed that there was ‘no evidence that
Parliament [had] ever sought to weigh the competing interests or assess the
proportionality of a blanket ban on the right of a convicted prisoner to vote,’ and
further, that there had been no ‘substantive debate by members of the legislature’ in

45

Cf the discussion of deference in the interstices of proportionality analysis in HJ Hooper, Chapter 19
of this volume, and K Roach, Chapter 22 of this volume. Cf also J Rivers, ‘Proportionality and
Variable Intensity of Review’ (2006) 65 Cambridge Law Journal 174.
46
The legislative background to the Communications Bill 2002 (UK), which prohibited political
advertising on broadcast television, is outlined in Animal Defenders International, above n15, paras 3564.
47
The legislative background to the measure, which prohibited British citizens who had been living
abroad for more than 15 years from voting, is described in Shindler, above n16, paras 15-28.
48
49

Animal Defenders International, above n15, para 116.
Shindler, above n16, para 117.
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light of human rights standards.50We support the general approach adopted by the
Strasbourg Court in these cases. But our analysis goes further. We would require the
court to make a prior assessment of the quality of deliberative debate according to
certain key criteria. Once this analysis is concluded, it will form one consideration in
the proportionality analysis. This contrasts with the ad hoc invocation of the quality of
legislative debate in the interstices of the proportionality analysis.
In all of this, transparency is key. Just as courts should develop clear criteria in
their application of the proportionality analysis, so they should be transparent in their
evaluation of the democratic deliberative process. The clearer the criteria, and the
better the reasoning courts use when taking a view on the democratic deliberative
process, the greater the potential for focused democratic dialogue between the arms of
the State.
While the Strasbourg Court has taken the lead in this area, it is also worth
noting that domestic courts have developed analytical tools to govern their analysis of
legislative materials in other judicial proceedings. Domestic and international courts
commonly refer to deliberative processes to clarify the ordinary meaning of the words
in a statute or to resolve ambiguities in the text.51 The construct of ‘legislative
intention’ pervades statutory interpretation and judicial review. 52 There is, no doubt,
room for improvement in the way that English courts have approached these
questions,53 but our point is that reference to legislative debate does not always invite
charges of constitutional heresy. In Australia, not renowned for its unorthodox
constitutionalism, the Acts Interpretation Act allows courts to consider ‘any relevant

50
Hirst (No 2), above n14, para 79. The Court echoed this phrase in respect of Hungary’s restriction of
the franchise for persons under guardianship in Alajos Kiss v Hungary, App no 38832/06, (20 May
2010), para 41.
51
See, in the UK, Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v Hart [1993] AC 593. In Australia, see Saeed v
Minister for Immigration [2010] HCA 23. Internationally, see the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law
of Treaties, articles 31-2. But cf Waldron, J, ‘Legislators’ Intentions and Unintentional Legislation’ in
Waldron, J, Law and Disagreement (Oxford, OUP, 1999), 119-46, arguing that there is no such thing
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material… in any official record of debates in the Parliament’.54 In Sweden, the
intention of the parliament, discerned through the drafting debates and the travaux
préparatoires to the legislation is the most important interpretive tool available to
courts. 55 Further, much of the criticism in England of courts’ engagement with
legislative material could be mitigated if courts were more transparent in their
analysis of legislative debate, and deployed consistent criteria across cases.56
In the discussion that follows, we propose a set of criteria to guide courts in
the slightly different context of judicial review of the rights compatibility of
legislation. These criteria give substance and structure to the courts assessment of the
degree of deference due to democratic deliberation of rights restrictions. They aim to
resolve whether the quality of democratic deliberation can outweigh the seriousness
of the rights restrictions in question.
1. The representative conditions in which legislative debate takes place
Supporters of judicial review frequently argue that unfettered majoritarian process
leads to an unfair override of the interests of the silent minority. In such conditions,
Ely would argue that human rights review plays a crucial democratic role.57 The first
question a court should ask itself therefore is whether parliament can demonstrate
engagement with the otherwise unrepresented voices of the minority. Was the
democratic debate on human rights, or limitations on rights, inclusive of
representatives of those whose rights would be affected? For example: did anyone in
the deliberative process represent the interests of asylum seekers, the Roma or
Muslim minority? Did this debate engage with their democratically represented
views, or was the consultative process instead characterised by ‘legislative or
executive indifference and inertia’58? Was there a balance of views or empathy with
rights bearers, given the democratic conditions surrounding the particular question at
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hand? This question is not concerned with ‘the substantive merits of the political
choice’ made by parliament,59 but rather with degree of participation and the quality
of the representation involved in the process.
No doubt it can be argued that participation of representatives of the affected
minority is important for instrumental reasons, since it may lead to better legislative
outcomes. The Doctors for Life case shows that when courts scrutinise democratic
processes, it can improve the quality of the legislation that is ultimately adopted.60 But
we think that participation in public debate is itself a substantive good. Shue argues
that participation is a fundamental constituent of the basic right to liberty.61 Waldron
describes participation as the ‘right of rights’,62 and argues persuasively that ‘there is
a certain dignity in participation, and an element of insult and dishonour in exclusion,
that transcends issues of outcome.’63 These insights are often marshalled in support of
parliament rather than judges being cast as the final arbiters on rights, since it is the
institution with the widest participation.64 Some theorists deploy these arguments to
discredit judicial review, on the grounds of its lack of democratic legitimacy.65 But
this relies on an underlying premise that all the relevant interests were represented in
the deliberative process, and thus the choice favoured by the majority should therefore
prevail. That premise does not always hold. Many rights bearers are totally ‘excluded
from majority decision procedures’, such as children, prisoners and asylum seekers. 66
Other rights bearers, while formally enfranchised, may be excluded or marginalised in
majoritarian processes in more subtle and complex ways.67 If the relevant interests
have not been represented ‘at the point of substantive decision’, then the majoritarian
premise does not hold.68
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Constitutional democracy is about more than simple majoritarianism: it is
about ‘democratic conditions’, namely ‘equal status for all citizens.’ 69 Dworkin
argues that majoritarian institutions must themselves ‘provide and respect the
democratic conditions’.70 Our proposition goes slightly further, namely that it is only
when those democratic conditions are provided and respected that parliaments can be
taken to have earned the deference of the courts. Consequently, courts should ‘keep
the machinery of democratic government running as it should; [making] sure the
channels of political participation and communication are kept open.’71 In this way
courts can enforce the democratic conditions that they themselves are accused of
undermining.
The court’s consideration of the ‘representative conditions of democratic
debate’ might also engage questions of the shape and make-up of the particular
democratic legislature. Is it constituted by a first past the post majority? Do minorities
get a higher level of representation through proportional representation? Are elected
representatives ‘beholden to an effective majority [who] are systematically
disadvantaging some minority out of a simple hostility?’72 Is there an upper house
with ‘teeth’? Are there other mechanisms in the human rights bricolage 73 for
representing minority views, such as in select committee proceedings, or in public
consultations and reviews? Does the parliament really work—or is there a continuous
one party majority? Is there a pervasive culture of political corruption? The
representative conditions of democratic debate form one important consideration in
deciding whether deference is due.
2. The quality of the consideration given to the views of rights bearers
Criterion two follows as a logical consequence of criterion one, and relies on the same
justifications. While the first criterion considers the structural question of
representation, criterion two asks courts to assess the quality of the legislative
attention given to the concerns of the affected rights bearers. To put this another way,
where criterion one asks, were the minority voices represented? Criterion two asks,
69
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whether Parliament meaningfully engaged with these minority voices. Were their
views taken into account and considered in good faith? Were the relevant interests
given weight, or were they simply heard and ignored? To what extent were the
recommendations of parliamentary select committees, national human rights
institutions or equality bodies weighed up in the legislative debate? As with criterion
one, criterion two recognises that ‘the duty of representation which lies at the core of
our system requires more than a voice and a vote.’74
The approach we advocate here draws in some ways on the concept of
‘meaningful engagement’ that has been developed by the South African
Constitutional Court. This interim remedy requires government and public bodies to
consider the implications of policy measures for affected groups and individuals, and
to enter into good faith discussions with those people in an attempt to secure a
mutually advantageous outcome. The concept derives from the 2008 case of
Occupiers of 51 Olivia Road in which more than 400 people who had been squatting
in unsafe buildings in inner city Johannesburg challenged a council eviction order.75
Rather than directly resolving the question of whether the eviction order breached the
applicants’ constitutional rights, 76 the Constitutional Court ordered the parties to
‘meaningfully engage’ with each other to find an appropriate solution. 77 While
developed from earlier cases, 78 meaningful engagement was also grounded in the
constitutional rights to life and dignity.79 The obligation to meaningfully engage is
one of process rather than outcome: a municipality seeking to evict people need not
necessarily succeed in its negotiations with the occupiers, but ‘it is the duty of a court
to take into account whether… at least, that the municipality has made reasonable
efforts towards meaningful engagement,’ and the absence of any engagement at all
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would be a persuasive factor weighing against the municipality.80 This approach
adopted by South Africa’s Constitutional Court has much to offer beyond housing
rights, and indeed beyond South African borders. One commentator has observed that
‘at its best, engagement [may] avoid the need for court involvement altogether.’81
‘Meaningful engagement’ exists as an interim remedy in the South African context.
However, it might also offer substantive guidance in framing the Court’s assessment
of parliamentary engagement with the views of affected minority rights-bearers. In
this way, it offers a benchmark against which to evaluate when deference might be
exercised by the Court.
3. Was there evidence presented to the legislature of the necessity of the measure
that restricts or violates rights?
Criterion three demands an assessment of the reasons for introducing the rightsrestricting measure. It relates to the manner in which the legislation was introduced
into parliament and the justifications that were offered in its defence. How necessary
is the restriction or violation? What is the public interest that it aims to serve? Did the
legislature consider other alternatives, or was the solution adopted the only one
proposed? Was there a meaningful attempt to engage with a broader policy problem?
Were the reasons for the adoption of the measure discussed by parliamentarians? Was
there a discussion of the relationship between the means chosen, and the ends
pursued? Was there plausible evidence presented to the parliament for why the rights
restriction was necessary or desirable to pursue?
The Strasbourg Court considered this criterion in Animal Defenders
International, observing that the Parliament had considered the measure to be
necessary by reference to the need to ‘prevent the distortion of crucial public interest
debates and, thereby, the undermining of the democratic process.’82 The applicants
argued that less restrictive measures were available to achieve the same objective,
such as banning political broadcasts only during election periods. However, the Grand
Chamber noted that those alternatives had been thoroughly discussed during the
deliberative process in Parliament, and there were ‘reasonable’ and ‘rational’ grounds
80
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for preferring the broader measure that was ultimately adopted.83 Animal Defender’s
International lends weight to criterion three.

It establishes that where there is

plausible evidence presented to the legislature for the necessity of the measure, and
alternatives to it are meaningfully discussed in Parliament, a greater degree of
deference or a broader margin of appreciation is due.
In conducting this assessment, courts should also recognise that moral
arguments about rights or their limitations may be present even where the language of
rights is not explicit. Bearing in mind that ‘one of the strengths of parliaments as
protectors of human rights is said to be precisely that capacity to move beyond
legalistic definitions of rights’,84 courts should recognise rights-talk even when it
appears in unfamiliar guises. The prisoners’ voting rights debate in the UK, for
example, was dominated by concerns about the legitimacy of the European Court of
Human Rights rather than any extensive engagement with the nature of the right to
vote. Nevertheless, submerged within that rhetoric was an underlying ‘forfeiture of
rights’ argument: ‘if you break the law you can’t make the law.’ Courts should thus
be alive to the possibility that moral arguments about rights can take varied forms, but
they should also be sceptical of empty rhetoric.
4. The courts’ own democratic mandate, institutional role and its place in the
constitutional culture and system
This criterion acknowledges that constitutional cultures and mandates vary
significantly and that courts’ perceptions of their own role in a constitutional
democracy will affect the level of scrutiny applied. For example, the constitutional
mandate could be very broad, but the court could be self-limiting where democratic
deliberation and executive review or regulation in the light of human rights is
exceptionally strong. Alternatively, courts may feel that it is legitimate to extend their
mandate or to push at the boundaries of popular understandings of their mandate
where the quality of democratic deliberation or executive deliberation is particularly
weak.
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By constitutional culture, we mean the ‘legal norms and principles that form
fundamental underlying precepts for our polity’,85 the ‘institutional values of the legal
system’86, or as Laws LJ said in Roth, ‘our judgment as to the deference owed to the
democratic powers will reflect the culture and conditions of the British state.’87 For
example, Germany has a ‘highly articulated rights culture’ and as such public
confidence in the judiciary may support a more interventionist position by the courts,
88

whereas in countries such as the UK where the place of justiciable rights within the

constitutional culture is matter of continuous dispute,89 a greater degree of deference
to more representative institutions may be warranted.90
Judicial intervention can enhance democratic deliberation by introducing
considerations that can be taken into account in legislative debate. In a dialogic
model, the courts may be called upon to define the parameters of the rights that are
implicated by a proposed legislative measure, and the permissibility of restrictions, if
any. A good practical example was the institutional dialogue following the decisions
of the Victorian Supreme Court and the High Court of Australia in a case concerning
the compatibility of reverse burdens of proof with the presumption of innocence.91
Ideally, parliament or the executive should take judicial remedial action in good faith
and embark on a discussion of the substantive issues articulated by the court.92 In
Clayton’s words, ‘the judicial decision causes a public debate in which the … values
85
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play a more prominent role than they would if there was no judicial decision.’93
Ideally, the response from the legislature will be respectful of the values identified by
the court, but achieve the same or similar objectives.94
When thinking about the court’s mandate, it is important to distinguish
between its constitutional deliberative position and its remedial power. For example,
in ‘weak’ models of judicial review, the court has the power to issue declarations of
incompatibility as distinct from ‘strong’ judicial review offering legislative strike
down of legislation.95 The more anti-democratic the remedy, the greater the caution
with which it should be used. Courts may have a greater impact on the democratic
process by adopting a weak remedy but a strong criticism. In a dialogic model,
judicial analysis of the strengths and weaknesses in a particular parliamentary debate
may enrich subsequent debate in legislative chambers. This may occur, for example,
when a matter is returned to parliament following a declaration of incompatibility by
the courts. 96 In that circumstance, judicial intervention can contribute to a more
constructive dialogue in parliament when the assembly considers the matter the
second time around. Kent Roach’s contribution in this volume discusses how judicial
invalidation of old laws can enhance democracy by demanding that parliamentarians
revisit the issue, often leading to better tailored legislative outcomes.97 But even short
of judicial strike-down, judicial interventions through declarations of incompatibility
can lead to productive parliamentary debate. 98 A good example of that process
working well was in the debate in the UK over preventative detention of terrorist
suspects post-9/11. When Parliament passed a law permitting detention of terrorist
suspects without charge for up to 90 days, the House of Lords remitted the matter to
Parliament for reconsideration, and the period of detention was ultimately reduced to
28 days.99 Judicial intervention enhanced the quality of the subsequent deliberative
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debate, and the UK Parliament responded with a better and less rights-restricting
measure.
Hence, we might view a Court’s criticism of parliamentary debate as an
interim measure, in much the same way as the ‘meaningful engagement’ measure
works in the South African context. By prompting democratic reconsideration of
right limiting legislation, the Court enriches the deliberative process. It also avoids
the question of which institution has the final say—a perennial question in
constitutional debate which in many ways distracts from the rights issues in play.
5. The nature of the right
Courts, as the ‘guardians of rights’, 100 must be prepared to disagree with the
legislature notwithstanding the quality of democratic debate. Recall that the
overarching question that these criteria seek to answer is how weighty are the rights
considerations, given the countervailing quality of democratic deliberations? By this
stage of the analysis, the court will have answered a series of institutional questions
encompassed by criteria one to four. This puts them in a stronger position to evaluate
the deference questions that now arise in the interstices of the rights analysis. This
includes, first, the interpretive determination of whether the right is engaged, and
second, as regards qualified rights, the conduct of the proportionality analysis.
The permissibility of rights-restrictions is inextricably bound up with the
nature of the rights in question. Rights ‘may be limited to pursue a wide range of
public and private interests’, but ‘that range is not unlimited, and the limits vary
according to the rights in question.’101 The importance of the right and the gravity of
the limitations will ideally be reflected in the democratic deliberations.
But even so, in exceptional circumstances, courts must be prepared to declare
certain measures incompatible with human rights, notwithstanding the most robust
and rigorous debate. As the Strasbourg Court observed in Shindler,
This is not to say that because a legislature debates, possibly even
repeatedly, an issue and reaches a particular conclusion thereon, that
conclusion is necessarily Convention compliant. It simply means that
100
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the review is taken into consideration by the Court for the purpose of
deciding whether a fair balance has been struck between competing
interests.102
In Shindler, the Court agreed with the legislature that the restrictions were Convention
compliant. However the Court observed correctly that strong deliberative process
cannot ‘neutralise’ a clear rights violation. For example, if a legislature votes to
torture terrorist suspects, no matter how strong the deliberative process, there is no
role for deference to play. Jus cogens norms are one category into which legislative
intrusions—even with the best possible parliamentary debate—may be clearly
excluded.
CONCLUSION
Asking courts to evaluate the quality of democratic deliberation is, on its face, a bold
proposal. But we make this proposal in the context of the shift towards a form of
constitutionalism in which responsibility for upholding human rights is shared across
all branches of government, together with a changing landscape of human rights
institutions. In this context, it is imperative to ensure the integrity of the framework as
a whole. In our view, this proposal will strengthen the partnership between courts and
parliaments in furthering human rights. This proposal invites courts to set the
parameters of the debate, while parliament determines where and how to strike the
balance in all but the most exceptional cases. Rather than undermining democratic
politics, this approach has the potential to strongly enhance that democratic
engagement. In a constitutional democracy premised on human rights and
fundamental freedoms, it is no longer appropriate to ‘equate “democratic principle”
with “majority approval”.’103
The concepts of due deference in the domestic context, and the margin of
appreciation in the Strasbourg context, are in urgent need of further substantiation.
Lord Irvine, writing extra-judicially, rightly observed ‘we cannot simply recite the
need for “deference” or “self-restraint”. Rather, we must, where appropriate, argue the
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case for it carefully and persuasively.’104 In this chapter, we have made a case for a
set of criteria that should inform the courts in this endeavour. This is not an invitation
to judicial activism; nor is strengthening deference tantamount to promoting the
‘abdication of judicial responsibility’.105 This is a proposal to deepen the rigour with
which deference is exercised, and an invitation to parliament to stand at the centre of
rights deliberation.
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Criteria for evaluating democratic
deliberation about rights
• The representative conditions of
democratic debate
• The extent to which Parliament
meaningfully engaged with the views
and interests of minority rights bearers
• The representative make up of
Parliament
• The power and make up of a second
chamber
• The existence of a a long standing one
party democracy
• The existence of politcial corruption
• The quality of pre-legislative scrutiny
• The extent to which parliamentary
bodies charged with rights based
scrutiny is taken into account
• The quality of the evidence for the rights
limitations presented to the legislative
assembly
• The Courts own constitutional mandate
• Quality of moral and political reasoning
about rights

The	
  nature	
  of	
  the	
  right	
  
• How	
  weighty	
  are	
  the	
  rights	
  
considerations,	
  given	
  the	
  
countervailing	
  quality	
  of	
  democratic	
  
deliberations
• Is	
  the	
  right	
  absolute	
  and	
  subject	
  to	
  
deference	
  at	
  all?
• Does	
  the	
  right	
  -‐	
  by	
  de@inition	
  or	
  by
factual	
  application	
  -‐	
  protect	
  minority	
  
interests	
  
• Does	
  the	
  right	
  engage	
  questions	
  of	
  
political	
  representation	
  or	
  exchange	
  
• Does	
  the	
  right	
  engage	
  majority	
  and	
  
redistributive	
  interests	
  

